Lecture � Curious machines

Greg Detre

Wednesday, February 12, 2003

 

Presentation � Call + Tomasello � Andrea Lockerd

nature vs nurture

boesch � most sophisticated in the wild

premack � display cognitive skills they display under no other conditions

�the plural of anecdote is not data�

 

physical domain

object permanence � little effect

symbolic play � only anecdotal examples

object manipulation, tool use, categorisation � some skill without contact, but more complex with exposure, observation

 

Andrea talks of levels of indirection � is this kind of like Dennett�s zero-order intentionality

 

Deb: being able to take someone else�s visual perspective is a kind of prerequisition for consciousness?

 

you can�t just put anything in a human environment and expect it to �

 

what might we gain from this for building curious machines?

an assumption that the culture around you is a learning environment

social motivation to enjoy the triaed of sharing attention for its own sake could underlie: declarative communication, joint attention, cooperation, and teaching/learning

some basic similarity seems necessary for imitative learning and scaffolding to work

 

could apes differentiate accidents???

could you break theory of mind into purposes and beliefs, and just have half???

kind of like the distinction between consequentialism and intentions-based morality�

what�s a common accident for an ape???

 

does everyone feel happy about what it means to say that something has theory of mind???

set of capabilties/skills vs a kind of encapsuated module???

unitary??? sometimes demonstrate, sometimes not

 

passing the false belief test needn�t require second order representation, just a large representation of the world???

 

�while failure � isn�t necessarily informative about a child or animal�s conceptual abilities, success is� - Bloom and German, 2000

 

Deb: what would be the Occam�s razor hack for passing the false-belief test besides actually representing (second-order) someone else�s intentional beliefs?

Cynthia: well, high-functioning autistic children seem to basically just learn a bunch of rules, like �if (the person is in the room AND looking at the boxes) OR someone told the person�, rather than actually representing the other person�s beliefs

 

Presentation � Meltzoff + Gopnik � Derek Lyons

I can�t help but feel that imitation alone would not be sufficient to make the jump towards assuming that what�s being imitated is a peer

 

Shettleworth: �imitaiton is what is left when all other mechanisms of social learning have been ruled out�

i.e. there�s something high/levelspecial about imitation � hmmm???

 

reference: Call + Carpenter: Three Sources of information in social learning. In Imitation in animals and artifacts, MIT Press 2002

primary question in defining imitation:

don�t understand + adopt goal � result doesn�t occur � emulation

don�t understand and adopt goal � result occurs � mimicry

understand and adopt goal � don�t get the result right � goal emulation

understand + adopt goal � result occurs � imitation

 

social learning

local enhancement � drawing your attention to the location/object

observational conditioning � when you already know a behaviour, learning by watching a conspecific to use it under similar circumstances

mimicry

emulation

imitation

the first two get ignored, but might well be crucial for boostrapping the last three

The argument

innate supramodal body schema mapping movement-as-seen to movement-as-felt

this is very complex

the mapping is not only onto proprioceptive state, but also onto the motor plan or intention required to achieve it

really!!!???

it is this mapping which bridges the infant�s external + internal worlds

predisposes the infant to think of people (�things that move like I do�) as having internal mental states similar to its own

 

Meltzoff + Moore. Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates. Science, 198, 1977, pp 75-78

previous to this, Piaget had claimed that infants don�t do facial imitation for at least 12 months

can imitate facial gestures as early as 42 minutes after birth

�I have difficulty learning new motor skills 42 minutes after getting off a plane�� � Derek

�it doesn�t get much more innate than that� � Meltzoff + Gopnik

 

they were pretty careful to avoid just global arousal � how???

could the experimenter being unwittingly providing feedback to the infant biasing its behaviour?

second set of experiments � baby has pacifier � experimenter makes faces � then waits with blank face � pacifier taken out 2 mins later � imitation still occurs � this means that the imitation is from memory, and it�s not reflexive

attack by definition � is this really �imitation�?

the infant doesn�t understand the goal

 

is proprioception as innate too then???

 

Problems

What could the mechanism be???

1997 paper � 20 years later

3 key components for any explanatory mechanism to have

key observation:

after demonstration, observe quieting of general bodily movement

the infant isolates what to move before determining how to move it

theory:

the infant has a small set of organs which it can recognise and map at birth on the basis of their form � innate neural mechanism

support:

visual display of faces/hands leads to activation in monkeys

 

body babbling:

definition:

the infant�s movement of its limbs + facial organs in body play is analogous to vocal babbling

theory:

the process of body babbling allows the infant to learn mapping between motor plans and resulting organ relation end-states

this could even start to begin in utero

 

iterative process of approximation

microanalysis of imiatating lateral tongue movement

 

might we see the progenitor of the innate supramodal body schema in apes?

Bard + Russell � duplicated the class Meltzoff + Moore study of facial imitation using 24-72 hour old chimp infants

imitative capabilities are found to be very similar to those of human subjects

this doesn�t quite fit with Call + Tomasello

but wouldn�t you expect it to lead further towards theory of mind than chimps get???

 

could we implement Meltzoff + Moore�s mechanistic handwaving?

would it provide the catalytic support for social learning?

the correspondence problem � extend this to dissimilar bodies?

dolphins can mimic human actions, high-level analogising rather than one-to-one body parts

 

infants can emulate both static + dynamic facial gestures

mirror neurons

motor cortex � if you see another primate do an action, they fire when you do it

presumably, the bit doing the recognition is the same as the system doing the generation

 

�pole-vaulting � the goal is to get over the bar without landing in hospital� � Derek

 

how could there be body babbling with facial movements???

how could there be an iterative process without feedback???

after all, deaf children don�t learn to speak�

do infants touch their faces while moving them???

you�ve got proprioception

I just don�t believe it could be hard-wired

can they do the imitation with non-facial bits??? e.g. if you hide their toes, can they wiggle them to imitate an experimenter

 

�understand and adopt goal� � what is �goal�?

hidden states?

surely the goal is the evaluation criteria??? too high level

 

how do these develop in perceptually-impaired infants?

 

Questions

why would the initial imitative capacity be there adaptively if it atrophies without use???

why is �emulation� not understanding/adopting the goal AND not copying the action successfully???

 

 

deaf babies babble too � and they follow a pretty standard progression in terms of the facial movements they make